Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

Utah v. Terry L. Hay : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; Marion Decker; assistant attorney general; attorney for
respondent.
Manny Garcia; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Terry L. Hay, No. 900457.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3212

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Tfttr^

:T No.y

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 900457
TERRY L. HAY,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a final judgment and conviction against Terry L.
Hay for one count of Criminal Homicide, second degree murder, a
first degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section
203, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

The appellant was

found guilty by a jury on July 14, 1990, in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. The final judgment
and conviction was rendered on June 17, 1991, whereby Mr. Hay was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
prescribed by law.
MANNY GARCIA
431 South 300 East #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARION DECKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114
Attorney for Respondent

F ILE D
SEP 1 5 1992
CLERK SUPREME COURT

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 900457
TERRY L. HAY,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a final judgment and conviction against Terry L.
Hay for one count of Criminal Homicide, second degree murder, a
first degree felony, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section
203, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).

The appellant was

found guilty by a jury on July 14, 1990, in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding. The final judgment
and conviction was rendered on June 17, 1991, whereby Mr. Hay was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
prescribed by law.
MANNY GARCIA
431 South 300 East #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
R. PAUL VAN DAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARION DECKER
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE, RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . .

7

ARGUMENT

8
POINT I

1.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
MISTRIAL BASED ON; a) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. . . 8
b)
THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT BY
WITHHOLDING EVIDENCE AND MISLEADING THE JURY. . . . 13
POINT II
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ALLOWING
GRUESOME DETAILS INTO EVIDENCE
CONCLUSION

18
20

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases cited

Page

Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964)

16

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215
(1963)
. . . . . 15-17
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d
104 (1972)
16
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F. 2d 125, 133-434
(3d Cir. 1984)
9
Halloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (1978)

... 9

McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1984) . . 19
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791
(1935)
16
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706
(1972)
16
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217
(1959)
16
State v. Bartley, 784 P. 2d 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . .

19

State v. Carter 707 P. 2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985)

17

. . . . . . .

State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980)

15, 17

State v. Jimenez, 761 P 2d 577 (Utah 1988)

14

State v. Johnson, 176 Ut. Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App.
1991)2, 8-10
State v. Lovato, 702 P 2d 6106 (Utah 1985)

14

State v. Maurer, 770 P. 2d 981 (Utah 1989)

20

State v. Ramirez, 159 Ut. Adv. Rep. 7, 16 N.3 (Utah 1991) . . . 2
State v. Stewart, 544 P 2d. 477 (Utah 1975) . . . . . . . . .

14

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)

2, 9

State v. Velarde, 806 P 2d 1190 (Ut. App. 1991)

9

State v. Worthen, 765 P 2d 839 (Utah 1988)
ii

17

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S. Ct. 2052; 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1974)
2, 9, 11
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Inst., 605 P 2d 314 (Utah
1979)
. 19
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d
342 (1976)
16
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988)

10

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), §76-5-203

1

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), §78-2-2(3)(i)

1

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 26(2)(a)

1

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 401 and 403

iii

18

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 900457
TERRY L. HAY,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to
§78-2-2(3 )(i), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) and Rule
26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, wherein a defendant in
a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Supreme
Court from a final order involving a conviction of a first degree
felony. Mr. Hay was convicted of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
Second Degree, a first degree felony in violation of §76-5-203,
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in denying defendantf s motion for

a mistrial based on:
a) ineffective assistance of counsel
and/or
b) prosecutorial misconduct?
1

2.

Was counsel ineffective in allowing gruesome details into

evidence which may have inflamed the jury?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues #l(a) and 2 regarding ineffectiveness presents a mixed
question of law and fact.

State v. Templin, 805 P. 2d 182, 186

(Utah 1990)(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668; 104 S.
Ct. 2052; 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974).

See also State v. Johnson, 176

Ut. Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Questions of law can be
independently reviewed (See Templin at 187).

Questions of fact

will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (Id at 187).
Issue #l(b), prosecutorial misconduct presents a question of
law to be reviewed by this Court for correctness. State v. Ramirez,
159 Ut. Adv. Rep. 7, 16 N.3 (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE, RULES
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules relevant to
the disposition of the appeal are set forth in the text of the
brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction against Terry
L. Hay for one count of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the second
degree, a first degree felony.
A jury found Mr. Hay guilty on July 14, 1990, in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
2

the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding.

The final

judgment and conviction was rendered on June 17, 1991, whereby
defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State
Prison of 5 years to life.
Trial counsel withdrew for purposes of appeal based on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.

New counsel was

appointed

to prepare and submit the appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 27, 1989, defendant Terry L. Hay, and the victim, Lony
Crosby, went to Wales, Utah, in Sanpete County and stayed with
Lony's grandparents.

They spent the next few days working for a

family friend and hunting and walking in the nearby mountains.
During that time, according to Arlene Crosby, Lony's grandmother,
there appeared to be no friction or arguments between the two boys.
(T. Vol. II, p. 244).
On Wednesday, July 31, 1989, the two went into the mountains
shortly after lunchtime. A while later, John Crosby Sr. heard what
he said sounded like two gunshots in rapid succession.

Later that

afternoon, defendant came down the mountain alone and gathered some
of his items from the Crosby trailer.
whereabouts of Lony.

Arlene inquired as to the

Defendant responded that Lony was still on

the mountain preparing for their dinner. The Crosby's did not see
Lony nor the defendant again. (T.Vol II, p. 245-247.)
Jennifer Bratt testified that, in the late evening of August
1, 1989, defendant came to her home dirty, upset and shaken.

3

Defendant told her that he had been hit on the head by Lony and,
when he awakened, Lony was gone. He surmised Lony may have gone to
Nevada to see a girlfriend.

(T. Vol. II. p. 270-272)

On August 2, 1989, defendant went to the home of Lony's mother
and stepfather. Defendant told Mrs. Crosby that Lony had stolen a
truck in Wales, and they returned to Salt Lake City.

Defendant

said Lony then left. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 319-323.)
On the morning of August 2, 1989, defendant spoke with a
friend, Travis Pearce.
nervous.

Travis said defendant appeared shaken and

Defendant told Travis that he had been asleep and, when

he awoke, Lony was gone. He also told Pearce that he stole a truck
in Wales to return to Murray. (T. Vol. III. p. 401-404).
Lony's mother and stepfather asked a friend who was a police
officer to question defendant about Lony.

Defendant told the

officer, Paul Pelch, that Lony had asked him to not reveal his
whereabouts, but that Lony was in Reno, Nevada.

Defendant also

said that he had heard from Lony (T. Vol. Ill p. 340-344).
During the period of Lony's absence from August 1, 1989, until
his body was found on December 31, 1989, defendant told people that
he had been in contact with Lony.
Crosby's family filed a missing person report on approximately
August 4, 1989. Defendant was again questioned regarding the last
time he saw Lony, and his response was the same. (T. Vol. III.
p.324. )
On December 31, 1989, two hunters found a decomposed body,
which was later identified as Lony Crosby, at Utah Lake in Utah
4

County.
Once the body was identified, defendant was questioned by Utah
County detectives*

He admitted shooting Lony and disposing of his

body in Utah County at Utah Lake; however, he stated the killing
was in self-defense as Lony had attacked him with a knife that had
a black handle with red trim.

He said the killing occurred in

Murray, Utah in Salt Lake County (T. Vol. I p. 34-40).

Detective

Jeff

over

Anderson

with

Murray

Police

Department

took

the

questioning. Again, defendant made statements implicating himself
in the shooting but asserting self-defense.
Defendant

told

Detective Anderson

that

Lony

had

girlfriend, Jennifer Bratt, who was also seeing defendant.

had

a

Lony

confronted defendant regarding this and Lony came after him with
the above-described knife.

Defendant described becoming very

frightened and shot at Lony in self defense.

He said he threw

Lony's personal items and the black handled knife in a nearby
river. (T. Vol. I. pp. 75-81.)
At trial, defendant testified that the shooting occurred in
Wales, Utah, up in the mountains by the trailer home belonging to
Lony's grandparents. He said he took all of Lony's items down the
mountain except for the red trimmed, black handled knife Lony used
to attack him, which he threw south from the campsite where the
shooting occurred. (T. Vol.1, III, page 449). He also testified
that he tried to hide Lony's body in a fire pit. Defendant said he
alone stole the truck from Wales, left it on a Salt Lake City road,
and anonymously contacted police as to its whereabouts. (T. Vol. I,
5

III. P„ 449-451 )o Several weeks later, he returned to the mountain
in Wales and moved Lony's remains to the site where it was later
located. (T. Vol. Ill p. 457-459).

In all his statements to

detectives and at trial, defendant asserted the killing was in
self-defense.
During the trial, testimony by detectives regarding the search
of the campsite area on the mountain indicated a number of items
were found and marked for evidence, including an old knife with a
black taped handle.

At trial, the State moved to introduce that

knife into evidence over defense objections of relevance, since it
did not match defendant's description of the knife Lony used
against him. (T. Vol. I,, p. 90)
After the case was submitted to the jury for deliberations,
defense counsel noticed the knife with a black handle and red trim
in the prosecutor's briefcase.

Counsel made a motion for a

mistrial on the grounds that (1) the existence of the knife should
have been provided in discovery; (2) if the knife was part of the
discovery, defense counsel was ineffective as she was proceeding
under the assumption that no such knife was found; and (3) in any
event, the State's action of introducing into evidence the black
knife had the effect of misleading the jury regarding the existence
of the actual knife defendant described, especially since the State
actually did have the knife, which would corroborate defendant's
testimony, but chose not to introduce it. (T. Vol. IV p. 592-597).
The court denied the motion, asserting that the corrective
measures

taken

by

the court

were
6

sufficient

to

remove

any

prejudice.

Defense counsel disagreed and renewed her motion for

mistrial, which was again denied. (T. Vol. IV p. 598-600.)

The

court "cured" the problem by submitting the knife to the jury along
with a brief statement from each side as to its importance.

(T.

Vol IV, P. 603-604)
Prior to trial, defendant moved the court to exclude evidence
regarding transportation of the victim's corpse by defendant on the
grounds

that

(1)

such

evidence

determination of guilt; and

was

not

relevant

to

the

(2) any probative value of such

evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and confusion of the jury.

That motion was denied on a

limited point of relevance, but the court indicated that if the
State got into gruesome aspects of the movement of the body, its
ruling would be otherwise. (T. Supp. p. 14-22)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At trial, the defendant claimed that he killed Lony Crosby in
self-defense.

The knife that he claimed Crosby attacked him with

was recovered.

Another knife, apparently unrelated to the case,

was admitted as evidence by the state over the objection of
defendant.

Defense counsel conducted

the defense and cross

examination while apparently under the impression that the knife
defendant described was not available.
After the jury went into deliberation, defense counsel noticed
the knife that defendant had described was in the prosecutor's
briefcase.

Defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial claiming
7

that she was ineffective for not realizing the knife was available
and

not

using

it

as

an

integral

part

of

her

defense,

or

alternatively that the prosecutor committed misconduct by hiding it
and misleading the jury. The prosecutor explained that he did not
introduce that knife because he felt he could not lay adequate
foundation for its admissability.

The motion was denied and the

Court attempted to "cure" the problem.

The knife was presented to

the jury, during deliberations along with a very brief statement
from each party regarding its evidentiary significance.
Counsel
argument

was

also

regarding

ineffective

some

in allowing

gruesome

details

testimony
involving

and
the

transportation of the body, after having secured a ruling that such
details would be inadmissible.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
1.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
MISTRIAL BASED ON; a) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
a)

Defendant contends the court erred in not granting his

motion for a mistrial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ordinarily claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
addressed

by collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings;

however, in some circumstances the claim may be raised on direct
appeal. State v. Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). Those circumstances exist when the defendant is represented
by new counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the
8

issue*

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F. 2d 125,

133-434 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18.

The

circumstances

the

are

present

for

this

Court

to

review

ineffectiveness claim raised in this case on direct appeal.
The

Sixth

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of
counsel.

An infraction of the right to effective assistance of

counsel can never be treated as harmless error. Johnson, 176 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 19, (Citing Halloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 So
Ct. 1173 (1978), see also State v. Velarde, 806 P 2d 1190 (Ut. App.
1991).
In ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts have adopted the twopart test of Strickland;
First,

the defendant must

performance was deficient.

show

that

counsel's

This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance

prejudiced

the defense.

This

requires

showing that counself s errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687; see also State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).

The purpose of the right to effective

assistance of counsel seeks to "guarantee an effective advocate for
9

each criminal defendant." Johnson, 176 Ut. Adv. Rep. at 19 (citing
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective, her
performance

deficient

and

that

serious

errors

were

made

in

conducting his defense, such that it prejudiced the defense,
depriving defendant of a fair trial.

Counsel admitted as much in

her motion for a mistrial.
The following exchanges took place when counsel discovered the
prosecutor had the knife:
THE COURT: The State of Utah versus Terry Hay.
Defendant
is present, along with his counsel.
Prosecution is present. It is 2:40 The jury has been
deliberating about an hour. I was notified by a knock on
the door that counsel for the defendant wanted to have
the benefit of the records for a motion. Go ahead.
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, we would have a motion
for mistrial, if I may state what occurred.
After the jury was excused I discovered the Mr.
Behrens had in his briefcase the knife with the black
handle and the red trim that was described by the
defendant during the course of his testimony.
THE COURT: Just a minute. Do you want to unshackle
the defendant?
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER:

Fine.

MS. PALACIOS: I was advised that this was provided
to me in the police reports. Quite frankly, I can't
dispute that at this point whether or not they were in
the police reports. If they were in the police reports,
then I believe that I would simply raise the issue for
appeal purposes on the grounds of ineffective assistance
of counsel, because in my obvious haste to prepare for
the trial -- I was sick for three days, and prepared over
weekend -- I did not catch the fact that that knife
existed, which would corroborate my client's story . . .
(T. Vol IV p. 592-593) . . . I want to make it clear that
the knife -- I'm not alleging that they hid it from me.
To thcit extent I take responsibility. As I said, I think
that I was ineffective not to do it. . . . (Id at p.
594).
10

. . .Mr. Scowcroft points out that we did not know that
the knife existed. However, as I was -- I can't remember
where it was in the record. I can't remember if it was
in the reports. They have represented to me that it was.
I did not get the knife. I wasn't shown the knife, and
I missed out on that part. . . (Id at 595).
In

fact, during

the preliminary

hearing, counsel

cross

examined Officer Anderson about the "knives" that were found.
Anderson said he had found a fixed blade knife. Prelim. T. p. 79 84.

Certainly counsel should have been aware of the knife.
The first prong of the Strickland test is met where counsel

failed to discover a material piece of evidence around which to
fashion a defense.

Counsel was deficient since the evidence was

critical and available. The error was serious because the evidence
had the potential value of strongly corroborating defendant's
claims of self defense and boasting his credibility. The error was
prejudicial because it weakened and altered the defense.
For example, without the knife, counsel was forced to confront
what the prosecution portrayed to be just another lie told by the
defendant, i.e., that the victim even had a knife, much less that
the victim

attacked

him with it;

the prosecutor's medical

testimony implied that the victim was not moving when shot.

With

the knife, the defense could have developed a sounder theory of how
the wounds could have occurred if Crosby were indeed attacking with
a knife.

Instead of having to speculate about an attack, and the

possibilities thereupon, counsel could have had a sound basis from
which to argue an attack and self defense. With the knife, counsel
could and should have focused more on the scene, examined it more,
developed

it more.

This would quite probably have enhanced
11

defendant's credibility as well as corroborating his account of the
incident. In short, counsel would not have given the scene and the
attack such short shrift.

That piece of evidence was critical to

defendant's defense. It was the only physical evidence that could
help the defendant.

Counsel's examination of the defendant was

affected by that lack of evidence. Counsel's argument was weakened
without that evidence.

She noted that the knife had not been

found. (T. Vol. IV, p. 576).

Defendant's entire defense was

compromised and altered because of the missing evidence.
It weis easier for the State as well, in disputing all the
defendant's claims that he was attacked with a knife.
The "cure" administered by the trial court did not remedy the
situation.

It was like a band-aid on a torn jugular.

Even though

the jury got to see the knife, and in spite of having counsel (over
objection) submit a "brief" statement of its evidentiary value,
this was all too little, too late.
compromised.

The defense had already been

Who can say what effect receiving the knife in such

an odd way had on the jury?

It surely only confused them, since

counsel had told them in closing that the knife had not been found.
Certainly a "dispassionate" reading of the stipulation accompanying
the exhibit was of no benefit to defendant. (See T. Vol. IV p. 599)
A three sentence statement by the defense as to its evidentiary
value was hardly sufficient to emphasize it importance. (See T.
Vol. IV. p. 604)
Defendant contends that counsel's ineffectiveness in failing
to discover and use the knife to fashion his defense served to
12

compromise his defense, to his prejudice.

He asks this Court to

find his counsel was ineffective and reverse his conviction and
grant him a new trial.

b)

THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT
WITHHOLDING EVIDENCE AND MISLEADING THE JURY.

BY

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in not granting
his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
which deprived defendant of due process by his concealing and
withholding from evidence the knife described by defendant.
prosecutor instead introduced an unrelated knife.

The

This had the

effect of misleading the jury. The concealment and withholding of
the knife was deliberate, based on where it was located -- in the
prosecutor's briefcase, not with the other evidence in boxes and
bags.
Once it became obvious that defense counsel did not know that
the knife was available, which was during opening argument, the
prosecutor had a duty to reveal it.

Instead, the prosecutor

conducted his case in chief and cross examination of the defendant
as if the knife did not exist.

He argued through inference and

omission that there was no knife.
"Well, the investigation continued and soon
they found evidence in Sanpete County. They
found this wood and these shell casings and
the shallow hole . . . (T. Vol. 10, P. 564)
Defendant contends his due process rights were violated by the
State's failure to produce the knife for admission into evidence at
13

his trial.

He argues that the knife was material to his case and

his defense and that there was a reasonable possibility that its
timely introduction would have tended to exculpate him and that it
would have had a significant impact on his defense as well as on
the jury.
In State v. Stewart 544 P 2d. 477 (Utah 1975), this Court
stated that a "deliberate suppression of evidence by those charged
with the prosecution . . . constitutes a denial of due process if
the evidence is material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant
in a criminal case. . . " Id at 479 (emphasis added).

See also

State v. Lovato, 702 P 2d 6106 (Utah 1985) and State v. Jimenez,
761 P 2d 577 (Utah 1988).

That proposition was clarified in State

v. Nebeker 657 P 2d 1359 (Utah 1983), where the Court said:
"The materiality required to reverse a
criminal
conviction
for
suppression
or
destruction of evidence as a denial of due
process is more than evidentiary materiality."
Id. at 1363. Rather, it must be "material
in
the
constitutional
sense."
Id.
(emphasis
added). Constitutional materiality requires
that there be a showing that the suppressed or
destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of
whether the defendant is guilty of the charge
and whether there is a fundamental unfairness
that requires the Court to set aside the
defendant's conviction.
Id.
The Court noted that evidence that only "might" have helped
the

defense

does

not

establish

constitutional

materiality.

Defendant contends the knife was vital to his claim of self defense
since it was the very object that he claimed to have been attacked
with and that he defended himself from.

Defendant contends this

evidence qualifies as material in the constitutional sense.
14

As

argued in point (a) above, his entire defense and trial strategy
was compromised by its unavailability. The state took advantage of
its own misdeed by conducting its case as if the knife did not
exist, which was dishonest and which misled the jury.

Defendant

argues that this violates due process and fundamental fairness.
Regardless of whether defense counsel forgot about the knife
or not, the prosecutor should have revealed it. He argued that he
did not introduce it based on foundational concerns (T. Vol. IV p.
596. ) He did not mention why he did not say anything about having
it there in case defense counsel wanted it introduced and/or would
stipulate to its foundation.
In State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980) this court
addressed the question as to what duty a prosecutor has to disclose
allegedly exculpatory evidence in a criminal case.

The factors

noted by the Court included the nature of the evidence, whether the
defendant had made a specific request for the evidence .
whether the defendant knew or with reasonable diligence should have
known about the evidence and to a certain extent, the conduct of
the prosecution. Id at 224.
"The underlying concern is, of course, to
make the judicial process a search for truth
and not just an arena of competition between
the prosecution and the defense.
For that
reason
the
adversarial
process,
which
generally serves well the judicial process,
must yield to the quest for truth, if there is
a conflict.
Both the United States Supreme Court and
this Court have dealt with the standards that
would be applied in determining whether
evidence should have been disclosed by the
prosecution. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963),
15

the Court held that the prosecutorial
suppression of evidence favorable to the
accused, in the face of a specific request of
the evidence violates due process if the
evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment. Good faith of the prosecution in
such an instance is irrelevant. Accord, Moore
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33
L. Ed. 2d 706 (1972). In Moonev v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791
(1935), the court first addressed
the
situation involving a prosecutor's use of
testimony which he knows or should know is
perjured.
Decisions following Mooney have
held that a conviction obtained by the knowing
use of perjured testimony is fundamentally
unfair and must be set aside if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct.
1173, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959). Apart from
prosecutorial
misconduct
involving
false
testimony, nondisclosure resulting from the
failure of the police or the members of the
prosecutorial team to inform the defense
attorney of exculpatory or other relevant
evidence may also result in a violation of due
process. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972);
Barbee v. Warden, 331 F. 2d 842 (4th Cir.
1964).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96
S. Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976), extended
the rulings of Brady, Moore, and Moonev.
Agurs concerned the duty of a prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory evidence which is unknown
and unrequested by the defendant. The Court
held that a prosecutor has a constitutional
duty to volunteer obviously exculpatory
evidence and evidence that is "so clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it
gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
produce," 427 U.S.at 197, 96 S. Ct. at 2399.
Specifically, the Court held that due process
is violated if the undisclosed evidence, had
it been disclosed, would have created a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
Whether the evidence created a reasonable
doubt must be evaluated in light of the entire
record as viewed by an appellate court:
16

*If there is no reasonable doubt
about guilt whether or not the
additional evidence is considered,
there is no justification for a new
trial. On the other hand, if the
verdict is already of questionable
validity, additional evidence of
relatively minor importance might be
sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt. [Id. at 112-13, 96 S. Ct. at
2402.]
In State v. Worthen, 765 P 2d 839 (Utah 1988) the defendant
had demanded all exculpatory and mitigatory evidence from the
State.

The court held that the prosecution has a duty to disclose

such evidence [citing Brady, Jarrell U.C.A. Title 77, Chapter 35,
Section 16(a)].

Indeed [that] due process requires the State to

disclose even unrequested information which is or may be (emphasis
added) exculpatory (citing State v. Carter 707 P. 2d 656, 662 (Utah
1985).

A Brady request for information is deemed a continuing

request. Id at 849. The Court further noted that a prosecutor has
a high duty to act fairly in conducting a criminal prosecution Id.
at 850.
As

noted,

the

prosecutor's

good

faith

introducing the knife is of no consequence.

reason

for

not

He had a duty to

voluntarily inform counsel that the knife was available even after
trial commenced.

Instead, he compromised the quest for truth and

violated fundamental fairness by proceeding as if the knife had not
been found.

There is a substantial likelihood that the evidence

affected the judgment of the jury.

The way it was given to the

jury, after deliberations began, with a brief explanation, had to
have affected them. They deliberated for nine hours on Friday and
17

then returned on Saturday.

(T. Vol IV. p. 609-610).

In viewing

the entire record as to the effect of the evidence, if introduced,
there would have been a much stronger basis from which defendant
could have argued self defense.

It would have enhanced his

credibility. This evidence was hardly of minor relative importance
-- it was crucial.

Defendant argues that the validity of the

verdict should be questioned.

Defendant argues that a duty to

disclose was violated by the State, and it prejudiced his trial.
Defendant submits that the Court erred in not granting his motion
for mistrial. Defendant asks this Court to reverse the conviction
based on prosecutorial misconduct and a violation of due process.

POINT II
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ALLOWING
GRUESOME DETAILS INTO EVIDENCE
Defendant

contends his counsel's

ineffectiveness

further

prejudiced his case when counsel allowed the State to present
gruesome details that inflamed the jury, after the defense had
secured a ruling that such evidence would be inadmissible.
At a pretrial motion, the defense argued for exclusion of
evidence concerning defendant's moving the victim's body, pursuant
to Rules 401 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, (T. Supp. p. 14-22).
The motion was denied on a limited point of relevance but the court
indicated that "If we were to get into the issue of some gruesome
aspects of the movement of the body, my ruling would be otherwise."
(T. Supp. p. 22). This court has previously held that:
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a
18

tendency to influence the outcome of the trial
by improper means, if it appeals to the jury's
sympathies, arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish or to
otherwise cause the jury to base its decision
on something other than the facts of the case.
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Inst.,
605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaaas Cos., Inc., 678
P. 2d 298 (Utah 1984); State v. Bartlev, 784
P. 2d 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Defendant contends the evidence elicited by the prosecutor and
not objected to by defense counsel regarding the movement of the
body was unfairly prejudicial and inflamed the jury.

Defendant

contends that counsel was ineffective by allowing the evidence
after the Court had indicated it would not allow it.
At the start of trial, the prosecutor read a stipulation into
the records that honored the Court's ruling on this matter. (T. Vol
II, p. 5). On direct examination of the defendant, his counsel was
careful to avoid any gruesome details about moving the body.

On

cross examination, the prosecutor established that the body had
been decomposing for six weeks; that it was a terrible sight; a
terrible smell, that it was in terrible condition; to a point where
it would almost be falling apart at the various limbs; that [his]
foot broke apart; take his foot out of the back [of the boot] by
the sock; . . . lay the foot down on top of him; picked up a
decomposing body . . . that the body was just dumped out of the
back of the truck

covered with garbage (T. Vol.

111. p.488-492).

The prosecutor even read the following stipulation into evidence:
"It is stipulated that when the remains
of Lony Crosby were located that his sock was
19

located on top of his torso near the
shoulders. Inside the sock were the remains
of his right foot. (T. Vol IV p. 534)
Counsel failed to object to any of this inflammatory evidence
and even stipulated to some of it. The only purpose the State had
for eliciting it was to appeal to, and arouse the jury's sense of
horror.
be

The trial court had already ruled that such details would

inadmissible

and

counsel

still

failed

to

object

to it.

Defendant argues that the evidence was highly inflammatory in the
eyes of the jury.

See State v. Maurer, 770 P. 2d 981 (Utah 1989).

Defendant submits that counsel? s deficient performance served
to prejudice his trial. Counsel allowed inadmissible, inflammatory
evidence to taint the jury.

Counsel asks this court to find his

counsel was deficient and to grant him a new trial.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully asks the
Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case back to the
District Court for a new trial.

Dated this

/ <T

day of

J^nJ^QrvJud^,
0

MANNir GARCIA",
Attorney for Defendant
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1992.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
September 1992.
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APPENDIX

Utah Rules of Evidence
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Rule 401.

Definition of "relevant evidence."

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waster of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.

APPENDIX B

Constitution of the United States
AMENDMENT VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

